Flammable vapor cloud generation from overfilling tanks: Learning the lessons from Buncefield  by Atkinson, Graham et al.
lable at ScienceDirect
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 329e338Contents lists avaiJournal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ j lpFlammable vapor cloud generation from overﬁlling tanks: Learning
the lessons from Bunceﬁeld
Graham Atkinson, Simon Coldrick, Simon Gant*, Laurence Cusco
Health and Safety Laboratory, Buxton SK17 9JN, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 21 May 2014
Received in revised form
9 October 2014
Accepted 20 November 2014
Available online 21 November 2014
Keywords:
Bunceﬁeld incident
Tank overﬁlling
Vapor generation
Dispersion
CFD* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: graham.atkinson@hsl.gsi.gov.
coldrick@hsl.gsi.gov.uk (S. Coldrick), simon.gant@hsl.g
cusco@hsl.gsi.gov.uk (L. Cusco).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.11.011
0950-4230/Crown Copyright © 2014 Published by Els
3.0/).a b s t r a c t
The Bunceﬁeld Incident in 2005 led to a signiﬁcant change in our understanding of how ﬂammable vapor
clouds could be generated from overﬁlling bulk storage tanks with volatile liquids. Prior to that incident,
it was widely thought that an overﬁlling tank would produce a pool of liquid in the bunded area around a
tank that would evaporate relatively slowly. However, in the Bunceﬁeld Incident, the release of liquid
through vents in the tank roof led to waterfall-like cascade of ﬁne gasoline droplets that produced
ﬂammable vapor at a much faster rate. It took only around 25 min for the dense current of ﬂammable
vapor to ﬁll an area roughly 500 m by 400 m to a depth of between 2 m and 4 m. The wind speed was
very low during the incident and the way in which the vapor cloud dispersed was affected by the slope of
the ground and presence of obstacles. The resulting explosion was severe, even across open unobstructed
areas. Fortunately there were no fatalities, but the total damage from the incident was estimated to have
cost around $1.5 billion. Since the Bunceﬁeld Incident took place, several incidents with striking simi-
larities have taken place at Jaipur (India), San Juan (Puerto Rico) and the Amuay Reﬁnery (Venezuela).
This paper presents the ﬁndings of the Bunceﬁeld Incident investigation team and further research
that has been carried out on tank overﬁlling releases over the last seven years at the Health and Safety
Laboratory (HSL). The work has involved a combination of unique spill experiments and Computational
Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling, and has resulted in a simple methodology for predicting the rate of
ﬂammable vapor production from overﬁlling tanks. This paper takes the opportunity to present for the
ﬁrst time a uniﬁed narrative, starting with the key ﬁndings of the incident investigation and culminating
with the description of a workbook method for predicting which substances and storage tanks could
create signiﬁcant vapor clouds.
Crown Copyright © 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
At 06:01:31 on Sunday December 11th 2005 a powerful explo-
sion devastated the fuel depot at Bunceﬁeld, some 40 km North-
west of London. Nineteen storage tanks containing gasoline,
aviation fuel and diesel were immediately set on ﬁre. The ﬁre
subsequently spread to a small number of additional tanks and was
not fully extinguished for several days.
Investigative work began immediately after the explosion,
despite the on-going ﬁre-ﬁghting operation. Damage to the site and
surroundings was extensive and the initial thoughts of theuk (G. Atkinson), simon.
si.gov.uk (S. Gant), laurence.
evier Ltd. This is an open access artinvestigating authorities were that the explosion might have been
caused by a large bomb. A substantial area was affected by the blast
(approximately 150,000 m2) and much of this was strewn with
debris. Examination of the scene by the security services yielded a
valuable set of early photographs documenting damage to a range
of around 500 m from the site.
Police helicopters were used for several days tomonitor the area
and numerous high quality aerial photographs were taken, allow-
ing the damage to be appreciated as a whole. Early police
involvement also provided the resources to interview a large
number of eyewitnesses in the immediate aftermath of the explo-
sion i.e. before they were exposed to media reports of the com-
ments of others. Eyewitness descriptions of events before during
and after the explosion provided valuable inputs to the
investigation.
Within a few days it became clear that the damage could not
have been caused by a bomb; although the severity of damage overicle under the CC BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/
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very signiﬁcant explosion event, there was no sign of a crater. Pri-
mary responsibility for investigating the explosion and ﬁre passed
to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Environment
Agency.
Detailed and systematic photographic records were made of
blast and heat damage to buildings, vehicles, trees, masts, tanks etc.
It became clear to investigators that a large area, well away from the
site, had been affected by ﬂash burning as well as blast. The evi-
dence for burning included scorched leaves and rubbish, such as
paper and plastic ﬁlm. A large continuous area surrounding the site
was uniformly affected by both blast and heat i.e. all vegetationwas
scorched and all pressure sensitive objects were affected. The area
powerfully affected by blast (e.g. vehicles crushed) did not extend
more than a few tens of meters beyond the edge of the burned
zone.
Aerial photographs conﬁrmed the observations on the ground:
the site was surrounded by a blackened area (all plant leaves
scorched) extending to a distance of up to around 250 m (Fig. 1). All
of this ground had been exposed (brieﬂy) to a vapor ﬂash and
contained crushed cars and severely damaged buildings. Outside
the area affected by the ﬂash, damage to vehicles was minimal;
buildings were affected only by damage to vulnerable elements
such as windows and cladding. The idea that the incident had been
caused by a vapor cloud spreading out in all directions from the site
began to be discussed by the investigation team. The burned area
would correspond to the area covered by the vapor cloud e or at
least that part of it that burned.
It took some time for CCTV records to be recovered from the site
and the surrounding buildings that lay within the area covered by
the cloud. This typically involved retrieving hard discs from broken
computer systems within ruined (collapsing) buildings. As in-
vestigators began to recover and view the data it became clear that
these images held the key to understanding what had occurred.
It was dark at the time of the release but the areas covered by
CCTV were well lit. Conditions were clear but the temperature was
close to the dew point. About 25 min before the explosion, cameras
close to Bund A (containing 3 large gasoline tanks) captured a
current of dense white mist ﬂowing westwards out of the bund;
outside the bund the mist continued to spread smoothly in all di-
rections at a speed of order 1 m/s. After a few minutes cameras in
the large car parks of nearby buildings showed the mist initially
ﬂowing in a very shallow, smooth topped layer. In one location
around 200mWest from Bund A, there are remarkable pictures of aFig. 1. Part of the southern edge of the vapor cloud at Bunceﬁeld. Vegetation within
the cloud (to the left) is all burned.worker arriving by car for an early shift. He successfully parked the
car and then walked away out of a cloud that extended to around
his knees but no higher. Over time, the depth of this layer increased
until it reached about 2 m over most of the areas covered by
cameras (Fig. 2). Around the source in Bund A the cloud depth had
increased to 4e5 m.
The upper surface of the vapor cloud was visible over large
distances and it was apparently undisturbed by any vortices. This,
and the symmetry of the spreading cloud, conﬁrmed that the
incident had occurred in nil wind conditions, with the spread of
vapor being driven by buoyancy forces.
Before process data could be recovered from the site, witness
statements started to give clues about the source of the vapor. A
tanker driver had seen the vapor current as it reached the tanker
loading gantry: alerted to the fact that something unusual was
occurring he looked around for a possible source and was able to
see what looked like a weak spray coming from part way down the
wall of a tank in the distance. Signiﬁcantly, he also reported seeing
mist further up near the top of the tank. All of this suggested that
the tank in question (Tank 912) might have been the source; if
liquid spilled out of the top of the tank and ran down the side, it
would strike a wind girder and be projected out, forming a spray
and mist trace at high level that would both correspond to the
witness description. When the tank level and supply pipe pumping
rate data became available, this overﬂow hypothesis was conﬁrmed
(Bunceﬁeld Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007).
At the time of the incident, Tank 912 was being ﬁlled with
winter grade gasoline at a rate of 550 m3/hr. The level reached theFig. 2. Off-site areas at Bunceﬁeld before and after the accumulation of vapor.
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tank roof. The overﬂow continued for around 25 min with the ﬂow
rate being increased to 960m3/hr about 8min before the explosion.
In parallel with efforts to uncover the root causes of the loss of
containment, the investigation team began to consider how the
outﬂow could have produced such a large cloud. The volume of the
visible cloud formed in 25 min was approaching 300,000 m3, cor-
responding to a rate of production of order 200 m3/s. Where did
this cloud come from?
Examination of the CCTV images and blast damage levels
convinced the investigation team that there was very little
entrainment into parts of the cloud further than about 20 m from
the tank. Explosion severity (and therefore presumably gas con-
centrations) appeared to be close to uniform over more than 95% of
the area covered by the cloud. The conclusionwas that all of the air
(as well as the gasoline vapor) was entrained into the vapor current
very close to the tank and thereafter the vapor cloud spread out in a
buoyancy current with minimal further increase in volume ﬂux.
Previous assessments of vapor risks around bulk tanks had
focused on pool evaporation in a range of wind speeds: nil wind
conditions were not considered as there would be no movement of
contaminated vapor away from the surface of a pool in a bund. It
became clear that a crucial aspect of the source term had been
overlooked e of particular signiﬁcance for low wind speeds.
In a tank overﬁlling release, such as that from Tank 912, a stream
of liquid from the top of a tank breaks up into a cascade of small
droplets. As these droplets fall through the air, there is a transfer of
momentum from the liquid to the air; the droplets are retarded by
the air and the air is driven into downwardmovement. This was not
a previously unknown phenomenon; many people must have
noticed that large waterfalls drive a strong current of air outwards
from the area where the cascade impacts the ground at the foot of
the waterfall. However, the signiﬁcance of this effect for industrial
safety had not been appreciated.
The entrainment of large volumes of air by freely falling cas-
cades of a volatile liquid produces a large and continuous ﬂow of
vapor. For overﬁlling releases from tanks of the size typically found
on fuel storage sites, the initial speed in the vapor current is of order
5e8 m/s. The shear between this current of vapor and the sur-
rounding air produces some initial mixing and dilution e
depending on the extent of recirculation in the immediate vicinity
of the tank. Moving further away from the tank, as the velocity of
the cold, heavy vapor current falls, mixing is progressively reduced
(due partly to stable stratiﬁcation which suppresses turbulent
mixing). In very lowwind speeds, the amount of dilution on the top
surface of the spreading vapor cloud may vanish completely, with
only a small degree of mixing at the front of the gravity current.
Under these conditions, the vapor current may run for very large
distances without diluting signiﬁcantly. If the (constant) concen-
tration of this extensive ﬂow is in the ﬂammable range, there is
potential for the production of a very large, hazardous cloud which
could sustain an explosion throughout.
The challenge facing the investigation team was therefore to
develop a quantitative understanding of the physical processes
involved in the formation of the Bunceﬁeld cloud. The team was
well aware that tank overﬂows and other elevated releases could
occur at other sites and that the risk proﬁle of a range of other sites
might have to be re-examined.Fig. 3. a: Reconstruction of liquid ﬂow from the top of the tank. b: Reconstruction of
ﬂow down the tank wall. Some liquid falls freely from the top and some runs down the
wall, impacts a wall girder and is projected outwards as a spray.2. Initial modeling work
From the outset, the HSL teamworking on vapor dispersion used
a combination of methods to tackle the problem: full scale testing,
ﬂuid mechanics and thermodynamic analysis, and CFD. In the end,each of these elements made crucial contributions to the devel-
opment of HSE's Vapor Cloud Assessment (VCA) method.
Large scale models were built of sections of the tank at Bunce-
ﬁeld (see Atkinson and Gant, 2012). The character of the liquid ﬂow
from the vents and over the edge of the tank is illustrated in Fig. 3a.
Tank 912 was ﬁtted with a “deﬂector plate” around the rim of the
tank top which would redirect cooling water running down the
roof onto the walls (in the event of an engulﬁng bund ﬁre). Flow
rates from the vents in the event of an overﬂow are large compared
with this cooling water ﬂow and about half of the liquid overﬂow
would have overtopped the deﬂector plate and fallen as a free
cascade from tank top to ground level. The remainder would have
fallen as a dense shower close to the wall before hitting a wind
girder part way down and being thrown out as a spray (Fig. 3b).
At the time, during the incident investigation, there was some
speculation that this liquid impact on the wind girder might be a
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quently been shown that this is not the case e all elevated releases
have the potential to form vapor clouds, even if they fall freely to
the ground.
Preliminary observations of the cascade width and droplet size
spectrum were made (at close to full scale). For water cascades,
droplets were large and irregular in size; most of the mass was
contained in droplets 4e6 mm in diameter. For gasoline cascades,
typical droplet sizes were around 2 mm diameter; anything much
larger than this seemed to readily break up (the surface tension of
gasoline is normally less 30% that of water). Droplets much smaller
than 2 mm diameter seemed to disappear rapidly due to
evaporation.
The extent of spread of the cascade (perpendicular to the tank
wall) is crucial in calculating the air entrainment and hence cloud
size and concentration. Reliable measurements in the open require
ﬂat calm conditions and low turbulence levels in the outﬂow liquid.
The ﬁrst HSL large scale experiments were done using an existing
facility and arrangements for settling the large pumped ﬂows of
liquid were rudimentary. Instability in the liquid outﬂow and the
effects of air currents led to signiﬁcant overestimates of the extent
of cascade spread; early modeling used a ﬁgure of 1.5 m for the
cascade width after a 15 m drop whereas subsequent experimental
project work with a purpose-built rig in very stable conditions
showed that the cascade spread is much less. The cascade width
increased rapidly as the primary breakup of the liquid streams into
a droplet cascade occurred, a few meters below the release height,
but thereafter the rate of increase in width was very slow.
During the incident investigation, estimates of mass entrain-
ment were made based on momentum conservation principles. If it
is assumed that the momentum ﬂux associated with gas and vapor
is concentrated within the area covered by the liquid spray, then
this analysis is possible without use of empirical constants
(Atkinson et al., 2008). In this respect, entrainment of air into a
cascade is very different to that in a gas jet or even the low mass,
high momentum sprays studied, for example, by Ghosh and Hunt
(1998). The key difference is that in the cascade both liquid and
gas phases are accelerating towards the ground. Contaminated air
that spills out of the cascade, because of vortices in the shear layer
at the cascade edge, is likely to be immediately re-entrained
because of the suction effect of drag on droplets. Thermal images
of large scale cascades support the assumption that there is rela-
tively little air ﬂow outside the area covered by the droplet spray.
Although the basic entrainment analysis was correct (and was
eventually used in the VCA method) errors were made in its early
application to the problem of overﬁlling. Firstly, it was assumed
that the air entrained would only depend on the fall as a spray i.e.
after the liquid streams had fully broken up into a liquid spray.
Since it takes some time for the liquid stream to break up into a
spray of droplets, the effective tank height in the entrainment
calculations was reduced.
In addition, the investigation team had seen images of a 4e5 m
deep vapor layer around Bund A. It was assumed the downward
vapor current within the cascade would disappear into this accu-
mulated layer and any subsequent mixing would not involve
entrainment of fresh air. The effective height over which entrain-
ment could occur was further reduced in the entrainment
calculations.
Both reasons for reducing the effective drop height turned out to
be spurious, so the early analyses substantially and inappropriately
underestimated the rate of entrainment. On the other hand, the
basic width of the cascade had been overestimated. Errors associ-
ated with both the width and fall assumptions largely (and fortu-
itously) canceled. The early estimates of vapor cloud size developed
in the initial investigation and subsequently published by HSL andShell (Atkinson et al., 2008) were reasonably close to the results of
much more detailed studies, which were backed up by extensive
large scale tests on a range of volatile liquids.
Estimates of cloud volume production and concentration were
used as inputs to a CFD dispersion model developed by Gant and
Atkinson (2011). This model represented the overﬂowing tank as
a source of vapor that welled up and out of the bund with minimal
momentum. Once the vapor had overtopped the bund wall, the
model predicted it to spread out across the site as a gravity current.
Studies were performed to investigate the sensitivity of the model
predictions to various physical and numerical input parameters:
the computational grid resolution, initial turbulence levels, surface
roughness, presence of porous barriers (e.g. hedges) and slopes.
These showed the dispersion behavior was strongly affected by
relatively modest slopes in the terrain and the presence of obsta-
cles. As a consequence, a detailed CFD model of the Bunceﬁeld site
was constructed using topographical data from a site survey. The
resulting detailed CFD model predictions were then compared to
the CCTV records, in terms of the vapor cloud arrival times at
various locations (Fig. 4). Themovement of the vapor front was well
predicted but the total cloud volume was somewhat under-
predicted. Most of the discrepancy was probably traceable to er-
rors in the early estimates of the source term volume ﬂux as the
entrainment fell away.
These initial developments of the CFD model allowed rapid
progress to be made subsequently on the dispersion analysis, once
improved methods of modeling the source term had been pro-
duced. Rather thanmodel the source as a prescribed upwelling ﬂow
of vapor from the ﬂoor of the bund, the later model calculated this
ﬂow rate of vapor using a coupled LagrangianeEulerian approach
to track the trajectory of spray droplets and account for the transfer
of heat, mass and momentum between the spray droplets and the
air within the liquid cascade.
By the time of the Hazards XX Conference in November 2008,
the basic elements of a scoping method for tank overﬁlling in-
cidents could be published (Atkinson et al., 2008). The purpose of
this method was to determine whether a particular liquid (e.g. a
solvent, gasoline blend or volatile crude oil) could generate a large
ﬂammable cloud if overﬁlled at a given rate.
Early results from CFD modeling of vaporizing sprays were
available at that time, but some elements of the problem were still
intractable: especially the width of the cascade (which needed to
be taken from experiments) and the effect on heat and mass
transfer of splashing droplets (at the base of the tank, where the
cascade hits the ground). Understanding of the near- and far-ﬁeld
dispersion, in terms of the interaction between the vapor ﬂow
and the bund walls, was also incomplete. The scoping method
adopted a number of conservative assumptions where technical
issues remained unresolved. For example, it was assumed that
droplets and the co-ﬂowing air would reach a state close to equi-
librium as the vapor ﬂowed out of the impact zone. Later experi-
ments have shown that this is in fact a remarkably good
approximation. Similarly, it was assumed that if a vapor current is
ﬂammable as the vapor emerges from the impact zone it may
produce a large ﬂammable cloud e i.e. near-ﬁeld entrainment may
be completely suppressed by an overlying accumulated layer. This
turned out to be overly conservative and it has been corrected in
the more recent VCA method.
3. Experimental and CFD development work
The uncertainties remaining in the HSE/Shell scoping method
(Atkinson et al., 2008) prompted further experimental and CFD
research on tank overﬁlling releases, using the test rig shown in
Fig. 5. The objectives were to re-examine some of the assumptions
Fig. 4. Comparison of CFD predictions (top) and CCTV observations (bottom) for the progress of the vapor cloud or mist across the Bunceﬁeld site. Times shown are in minutes from
the moment the mist appeared over the wall of Bund A.
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sumptions with more fundamental models and data. The key areas
for experimental work were:
1. Measurements of cascade dimensions and air entrainment
2. Analysis of the effects of splashing on heat and mass transfer
3. Analysis of the effects of ﬁne splash products carried into the
vapor current
4. Provision of data in and beyond the cascade to allow the
development and testing of CFD models.
The key areas for CFD development were:
1. Appropriate representation of droplets in the cascade
2. Accounting for the effects of splashing3. Investigating effects of tank bunds and other obstructions on
entrainment.4. Key ﬁndings in experimental studies
4.1. Flow characterization in the cascade
Fig. 6 shows typical measurements of liquid temperatures across
a free cascade about 10 m below the release height. Substantial
temperature drops are observed because of the vaporization of
droplets. These results illustrate the difﬁculties associated with
such measurements in the open air: The cascade is only about
400 mm wide e exceptionally stable conditions are required to
resolve its internal structure. Fig. 7 shows a collection of such
Fig. 5. HSL tank-overﬁlling test facility showing location of measurement equipment.
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divided by the temperature drop to be expected if liquid and vapor
reach full equilibrium. The results show that the extent of vapor-
ization in the cascade is normally only about 70% of that which
would be possible if full equilibrium with entrained air was
reached.
One interesting ﬁnding from both experiments and modeling
was that the average liquid temperature at the base of the cascade
was a little higher than the co-ﬂow of vapor. At ﬁrst sight this is
difﬁcult to understand, since evaporative cooling should produce a
fall in the droplet temperatures below ambient. The observed effect
only occurs because droplet breakup produces a range of fragmentsizes. Smaller droplets cool very rapidly and the whole fragment
may evaporate completely into very cold vapor. Larger droplets that
hold the bulk of the mass cannot vaporize quickly enough to match
the rate of vapor cooling.4.2. Liquid and vapor ﬂow after impact
Measurements of liquid temperatures are much more straight-
forward to make in the outﬂow of liquid running along the ﬂoor
away from the impact point. This material is naturally mixed and
the temperatures recorded are not particularly sensitive to slight
G. Atkinson et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 329e338 335movements of the cascade trajectory. Comparison of temperatures
in this ﬂow and in the liquid approaching impact show that the
temperature of the liquid drops rapidly and signiﬁcantly during the
impact process. Fig. 8 shows the post-impact temperatures for the
experiments shown in Fig. 7. Little additional air is entrained in the
impact zone but the generation of ﬁne splash fragments during the
impact and the high slip velocities between droplets and vapor lead
to greatly enhanced rates of heat and mass transfer. The liquid/
vapor system is therefore pushed much closer to equilibrium. The
amount of liquid vaporized typically rises to around 90% of the
maximum possible (equilibrium level). A relatively large propor-
tion of the liquid (around 50%) forms ﬁnely divided droplets in the
impact zone but most of these are immediately driven back into the
liquid ﬂow on the ground e a few are snatched away from the
surface by strong eddies and carried out of the impact zone by the
vapor ﬂow.
4.3. Splash evaporation zone
As vapor ﬂows rapidly away from the impact point it entrains
fresh air. In the absence of droplets, the vapor temperature would
rise rapidly as warm air enters the vapor current. However, ther-
mocouples outside the splash zone showed that temperatures
remained low, which indicated that ﬁne droplets were present in
the vapor ﬂow for several meters from the impact point. The
vaporization of these droplets produces a cooling effect that offsets
the inﬂow of warm air. Measurements of the vapor temperature
just after the droplets disappeared suggested that for hexane the
total amount of extra vaporization associated with these ﬁne splash
products was about 10e20% of the total. Overall, the rate of
vaporization tends to be around 100e110% of that which would
have been predicted on the basis of the entrainment into the
cascade (only) and attainment of full equilibrium.
To summarize: spray vaporization (post-impact) makes a small
but signiﬁcant contribution to the total vaporization rate. The effect
on vapor temperatures is much more pronounced because spray
evaporation occurs where the heat capacity of the ﬂow is not
dominated by the liquid ﬂow.
4.4. Near-ﬁeld dispersion
Fig. 9 shows measurements of gas concentration where the
vapor currents from various hexane cascades pass over either ver-
tical or sloping bunds that are located at different distances from0
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Fig. 9. Gas concentration measurements for various bund shapes and locations.the impact point. Vertical bund walls direct the primary vapor
current upward leading to recirculation and accumulation of vapor
in the bund. The primary vapor current tends to run straight over
sloping bund walls and there is minimal recirculation of this for-
wards ﬂow. However, part of the gas ﬂow away from the impact
point is backwards or sideways and much of this vapor does
accumulate in the bund. Overall, the concentration in the bund is
much reduced compared with a vertical wall of the same height.
On the other hand, the ﬂow of vapor out of a bund with vertical
walls can reach a substantial height and it entrains air strongly as it
slumps down out of the bund. In contrast, the ﬂow over a sloping
bund entrainsmoderately throughout rather than at the edge of the
bund. Systematic studies of dispersion in a range of geometries over
long periods of time have been carried out with CFD (Coldrick et al.,
2011). Further details of experimental work can be found in
Atkinson and Coldrick (2012a, 2012b).5. Key ﬁndings of CFD work
The CFDmodel used to investigate the production of vapor from
tank overﬁlling releases is shown in Fig. 10. A coupled Lagran-
gianeEulerian approach was used to simulate the dispersion of
liquid droplets in the cascade and their evaporation into vapor. The
exchange of momentum, mass and heat between the vapor and
droplets was two-way. Droplets falling through the air were sub-
jected to drag forces, and their trajectories were affected by tur-
bulent perturbations in the air. The air was also affected by the drag
of the droplets and entrained into the spray.
Although CFD sub-models have been developed to predict the
primary breakup of a liquid sheet into droplets, these models were
developed for devices such as high-pressure fuel injectors andwere
not found to be suitable to model gravity driven cascade ﬂows.
Instead of trying to predict the droplet breakup, an empirically-
based approach was taken in developing the HSL model in which
the post-breakup droplet size spectrum was speciﬁed to provide a
good representation of measured vapor and liquid temperatures in
the cascade. The mean size of the larger droplets (where mass is
concentrated) was adjusted to match the measured (mass
weighted) liquid temperatures, and the proportion of smaller
droplets was adjusted in order to match the measured vapor
temperatures. The smaller droplets have a minimal effect on
average liquid temperature but strongly affect the vapor
temperatures.
Satisfactory ﬁtting of the CFD predictions to measurements in
hexane cascades was achieved using a Rosin-Rammler droplet size
distribution with a mean diameter of x ¼ 2 mm and index of g ¼ 3:
1 v ¼ exp
x
x
g
(1)
where (1n) is the volume fraction of liquid contained in droplets
larger than x. This ﬁt was tuned to a particular set of experiments,
and the model was then applied separately to simulate further
experiments under different conditions (i.e. different liquid release
rates). The agreement between the model predictions and mea-
surements in these independent tests was good, which indicated
that the droplet size spectrum could be applied more generally,
rather than on a case-by-case basis with tuning necessary for each
experiment.
The experimental work suggested that splashing droplets were
signiﬁcant in promoting heat and mass transfer in the impact re-
gion, and that there was some additional vaporization of ﬁne spray
carried into the vapor current. Potential methods of representing
the effects of splashing droplets were examined by Coldrick et al.
(2011). Attempts to directly model the splashing and
Fig. 10. CFD model of one of the HSL tank overﬁlling experiments involving a sloping bund. This snapshot is taken 20 s after the start of the release. Trajectories of spray droplets are
colored according to the droplet temperatures and contours show the predicted vapor concentrations.
Table 1
Dilution factors for constrained vapor ﬂows.
Barrier height (m) Cloud depth (m) Distance to barrier(m) Dilution factor
4 5 30 1.5
2.5 3.6 30 2.1
2 Not recorded 5 1.8
2 Not recorded 10 2.0
2 Not recorded 15 2.0
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at the base of the cascade was accounted for by a secondary in-
jection of particles with a prescribed size, mass ﬂow, temperature
and velocity. Again these parameters were adjusted to reproduce
the measurements made in the near-ﬁeld part of the vapor current.
More details of the CFD model can be found in the works of
Coldrick et al. (2011) and Atkinson and Coldrick (2012a). Further
background to the development and validation of the CFD model
for sprays and tank overﬁlling cascades can be found in the works
of Gant and Atkinson (2012) and Gant et al. (2007).
The CFD model predictions showed that if the vapor ﬂow away
from the tank is constrained in some way by either the presence of
a nearby bund wall or distant changes in ground level (or buildings
etc.) then there will be some re-entrainment of vapor into the
cascade. In these circumstances, the vapor concentration in the
bund and the dispersing cloud increases with time, until the
pattern of re-entrainment is established. The higher the bund or
constraints, the deeper the ﬁnal vapor layer and the lower the
proportion of fresh air that dilutes the vapor ﬂow from the tank
before it joins the cloud.
Results of studies of re-entrainment and the effect on vapor
dilution using CFD were reported by Atkinson and Coldrick (2012a)
and some typical results are shown in Table 1. The dilution factor in
this table refers to the ratio of the vapor concentration in the
cascade to average concentration of the vapor in the cloud within
the bund.
All of the barriers in Table 1 were vertical but the effect of
different (sloping) bund proﬁles has been investigated and for long
duration releases the bund shape makes little difference. Similarly,
the data show that the dilution factor is insensitive to the location
of bunds or other constraints.
The reason for this convenient and somewhat surprising result
is that entrainment is normally dominated by air drawn rapidly into
a very small area immediately surrounding the impact zone. Back-
ﬂow of vapor from the bund is too sluggish to prevent fresh air
being drawn into the vapor. The situation is analogous to the ﬁnal
stages of draining a bath: at some point water from the shallow
layer cannot drain back quickly enough to prevent air being
entrained into the plug ﬂow.A vertical bund, close to the tank, establishes a deep layer that
suppresses some near ﬁeld dispersion but such a bund also in-
troduces additional dilution as vapor ﬂows out of the bund. These
effects are illustrated in Fig. 11 which shows multiple cascades
discharging into a bund. Vapor immediately surrounding the cas-
cades is displaced by the entrained air and further entrainment
occurs as the vapor spills over the bund. The CFD analyses show
that the net effect of changing the bund is actually very small: itFig. 11. CFD model of an accumulating vapor layer within a bund. The plot shows a
surface of the LEL concentration colored with height from the ground.
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close or distant, vertical or sloping or even absent.
These are useful general results that have been adopted in HSE
Vapor Cloud Assessment (VCA) method to provide basic guidance
on cloud development on fairly ﬂat uncluttered sites. CFD has a vital
role to play in further development of low wind speed vapor cloud
assessment in circumstances where topography or structures have
an important effect on vapor ﬂow, or where more accurate results
are required because of the proximity of vulnerable targets to po-
tential sources of vapor. HSL is actively engaged in a range of such
specialized dispersion studies, where the results are being used to
develop various mitigation strategies. This work has contributed to
developing an understanding of the extent to which vapor barriers
can be used to control risk.
6. HSE Vapor Cloud Assessment (VCA) method
HSE's Vapor Cloud Assessment (VCA) method (Atkinson and
Coldrick, 2012a) provides a means of calculating the rate at which
the volume of a vapor cloud increases during an overﬁlling incident.
The analysis also gives the concentration of hydrocarbons in the
cloud.
Of more practical signiﬁcance is the extent of the area covered
by the vapor cloud. In general, this depends on the speciﬁc site
topography, i.e. slopes and obstacles that may impede, encourage
or redirect the ﬂow of vapor. If the site is fairly ﬂat and open (like
Bunceﬁeld or Jaipur) the cloud tends to spread symmetrically (at
least initially). The VCA method can be used in these circumstances
to estimate the time at which a vapor cloud will extend to engulf a
particular location (e.g. a site control room or tanker ﬁlling gantry).
If assumptions are made about the maximum duration of the
overﬁlling incident then the method can also be used to estimate
the maximum extent of the cloud.
The method can be used to carry out assessments for a speciﬁed
grade of winter gasoline without the need for additional thermo-
dynamic analysis. Application to other volatile liquids requires the
user to determine the equilibrium state when the ﬂuid is mixed
with various amounts of air. A number of worked examples are
provided in the report (Atkinson and Coldrick, 2012a).
7. FABIG technical note 12 (Atkinson and Pursell, 2013)
This document extends the scope of the VCA method. Parame-
terized thermodynamic analyses are available for hexane, acetone,
ethyl acetate, benzene, MEK, toluene, methanol, ethanol and a
range of mixtures with deﬁned compositions: naphtha, winter
grade gasoline, raw gasoline, F3 condensate, stabilized Brent Crude,
reformate and heavy reformate. The assessment method is also
suitable for other liquids but a simple thermodynamic analysis is
required.
This document also provides some preliminary advice on the
integration of cascade vaporization into the source term for the
assessment of windy conditions.
The risks associated with spray releases, as opposed to tank-
overﬁlling releases, were exempliﬁed by the Jaipur incident
(MoPNG Committee, 2010) in which gasoline was forced from an
upward facing opening at the foot of the tank, simply by the hy-
drostatic pressure exerted by ﬂuid in the tank. The loss of
containment continued for more than an hour and a very large
ﬂammable vapor cloud was formed extending to more than 500 m
from the source in some directions.
Many of the physical processes that apply in such a release are
common with the overﬁlling tank problem. Entrainment of air into
the liquid spray occurs on the way up and on the way down. For
relatively low-pressure, high-volume releases, the area covered bythe liquid spray is larger on the downward part of the trajectory,
and this is where most air is entrained.
The vertical extent of the drop is often comparable with that in a
tank overﬁll cascade and for hydrocarbons it would be expected
that the droplets to be sufﬁciently ﬁne to bring the liquid fairly
close to equilibrium with the entrained gas e as was the case for
overﬁll cascades. There is also an impact zone in which enhanced
heat and mass transfer after splashing brings the liquid and vapor
phases even closer to equilibrium.
A wide range of hole shapes and sizes are possible and the
distribution of liquid in the spray can vary much more widely than
was the case for cascades of liquid during overﬁlls. Normally, failure
of a pipework system is a very unlikely event and may involve
corrosion or complex third-party actions such as damage from
mechanical excavators, dropped objects or collisions. The geometry
of such breaches is not normally known in advance although some
common faults such as ﬂange leaks should be considered. The
normal method of risk assessment is to assume a series of char-
acteristic hole sizes and frequencies. A simple hole-geometry is
then assumed to allow the hazard range to be assessed.
FABIG TN 12 (Atkinson and Pursell, 2013) presents an analysis of
the cloud characteristics for a range of sprays. These results suggest
that, as a rule of thumb, a spray of gasoline can produce a cloud
capable of powerful explosion (i.e. stoichiometric concentration) at
a rate approximately 1200 times the volume outﬂow rate of liquid
gasoline. For very diffuse sprays a ﬂammable cloud can be produced
at a rate up to approximately 3500 times the liquid outﬂow rate e
the fuel concentration in such a cloud would be close to the Lower
Explosive Limit (LEL). A range of examples are also given on the use
of the method for hazard assessment in the case of tank overﬁlling
and spray releases.8. Conclusions
Bunceﬁeld and other recent major incidents at Jaipur (India),
San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Amuay Reﬁnery (Venezuela) have
highlighted the risks associated with very large explosible vapor
clouds developing in calm conditions. Such clouds may continue to
grow for as long as the release continues and distances well in
excess of 500 m have been observed. Source terms in all of these
cases involved liquid releases at elevation, either from tank over-
ﬂowing releases or pressurized sprays. In all of the cases, the
entrainment of air into the spray produced a continuous source of
dense vapor that, under the low wind speed conditions, led to the
accumulation of a large ﬂammable cloud. The Amuay Reﬁnery ex-
plosion appears to provide a particularly clear illustration of the fact
that low wind speeds represent a worst case. In this incident, a
long-duration release was initially dispersed by a light breeze. Only
when the wind decreased did the ﬂammable cloud extend to
around 700 m from the source.
Dispersion in very low or nil wind speeds is likely to be the
worst case for many loss of containment events and it should be
routinely included in risk assessments. Although not covered by
established risk assessment tools, such as PHAST (DNV, 2013), a
variety of newmethods of analysis e for example FABIG TN12e are
now available for general use. The work described in this paper
suggests that CFD methods may also be useful, particularly for sites
with complex terrain. However, careful consideration needs to be
given to CFD model veriﬁcation and validation.Acknowledgement
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